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Myers v. Reno Cab Co., Inc., 137 Nev. Ad. Op. 36 (July 29 2021).1
EMPLOYMENT LAW: EMPLOYMENT STATUS UNDER NRS 608.155
Summary
The Nevada Supreme Court reversed and remanded consolidated appeals of a district
court order granting summary judgment in minimum wage matters. The question considered
was whether the appellants were “employees” or “independent contractors” under the scope of
the Minimum Wage Act and waiting time penalties for late-paid wages. The employee status for
the Minimum Wage Amendment (MWA) under the Article 15, Section 16 of the Nevada
Constitution is determined only by the economic realities test. The employee status for purposes
of statutory waiting time penalties for late-paid wages may be affected by the presumption set
forth in NRS 608.0155. The court reaffirmed that a contractual recitation stating a worker is not
an employee is not conclusive under either test and is determined by the facts presented to the
court. Further, employee status for the purpose of MWA or NRS Chapter 608 is not affected by
the Nevada Transit Authority’s approval of a taxi lease under NRS 706.473. The Court held the
district court erred when granting NTA’s approval of appellant leases foreclosed further inquiry
into their employee status and the Court reversed and remanded.
Facts and Procedural History
In 2015, the drivers sued the taxicab companies alleging their pay was often less than the
MWA requirement for minimum hourly wage. The taxicab companies leased taxicabs to the
drivers under agreements approved by the NTA, pursuant to NRS 706.473.
The drivers argued they were in fact employees under the “economic realities” test as
clarified in Terry v. Sapphire Gentlemen’s Club.2 Terry involved the statutory right to a
minimum wage, here, the drivers argued that the same test should apply to their MWA claims.
In addition, the drivers alleged that they were not paid all the wages they were owed at the time
of separation, entitling them to waiting time penalties under NRS 608.040.
The cab companies moved for summary judgment, arguing that the drivers were
independent contractors, not employees, for the purposes of the minimum wage laws. The
district court initially denied the first motion, but then the court later granted the cab companies’
renewed motion. The court based its decision solely on the fact that the drivers had NTAapproved taxicab leases. The court reasoned that when the NTA approves a lease pursuant to
NRS 706.473, it confirms that the parties of the lease have entered a “statutorily created
independent contractor relationship.”3 The court further held a worker who is an independent
contractor under NRS 706.473 is not an employee for any purpose, and thus the protections
afforded to “employees” by the MWA and NRS Chapter 608 did not apply. The drivers
appealed, and the Supreme Court consolidated the appeals.
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By Colleen C. Freedman.
Terry v. Sapphire Gentlemen’s Club, 130 Nev. 879, 336 P.3d 951 (2014).
See Yellow Cab of Reno, Inc. v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 127 Nev. 583, 592, 262 P.3d 699, 704 (2011).

Discussion
Standard of Review
The Court reviews de novo, the order granting a NRCP 12(b)(5) motion to dismiss.4 The
facts are undisputed, and the existence of an employment relationship under a given test is a
question of law that can be resolved at summary judgment. 5 Under Doe Dancer, the proper legal
test for MWA and NRS Chapter 608 is a question of law, which the Court reviews de novo.6
A contractual disavowal of an employment relationship
The Court first disposed the cab companies’ argument that the recitation in the lease
agreement was conclusive evidence that the drivers were independent contractors for MWA and
NRS Chapter 608 purposes. Each agreement contained the following language:
RELATIONSHIP: Neither Party is the partner, joint venture, agent, or representatives of
the other Party. LESSEE is an independent contractor. LEASING COMPANY and LESSEE
acknowledge and agree that there does not exist between them the relationship of employer and
employee, principal and agent or master and servant, either express or implied, but that the
relationship of the parties is strictly that of lessor and lessee, the LESSEE being free from
interference or control on the part of the LEASEING COMPANY.
The Court noted that employment relationships are not solely dependent on recitations
within a contract and facts proven in court determine the worker’s actual employment status.
Further, the Court rejects the cab companies’ application of Kaldi v. Farmers Insurance
Exchange, where the Court relied on a contract provision to find that no employment relationship
existed.7 However, Kaldi was not concerned with any “remedial statute” or constitutional
provision, but only with an alleged contractual right to be free from termination except for good
cause.8 In the instant case, the drivers seek to enforce a right that if they are employees under the
appropriate tests, is guaranteed to them by law, not by contract.
The Court held that a worker is not automatically an independent contractor solely
because a contract says so. The court must determine employee status under the applicable legal
test, based on all the relevant facts.
NRS 706.473 does not affect the test for employment status under the MWA or NRS Chapter 608
Next, the Court analyzed whether NRS 706.473 affected the test for employment status
under the MWA or NRS Chapter 608. This Court has held that a statutorily created independent
contractor relationship exists as a matter of law when all the statutory and administrative
requirements for creating an independent contractor relationship are satisfied. 9 The drivers’
leases were approved by the NTA pursuant to NRS 706.473, which permits a company to lease a
taxicab to an independent contractor. 10 The district court held that because the NTA approved
the drivers’ leases and all other administrative requirements were satisfied, the relationship
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Terry, 130 Nev. At 889, 336 P.3d at 958.
6 See Doe Dancer I v. La Fuente, Inc., 137 Nev., Adv. Op. 3, 481 P.3 860 (2021).
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8 Id.
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10 NEV. REV. STAT. 706.473 (2021).
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between the drivers and the companies was a “statutorily created independent contractor
relationship” and the drivers were not entitled to protection of either the MWA or NRS Chapter
608. However, this Court found the district court erred in its assumption that an independent
contractor under NRS Chapter 706 is necessarily an independent contractor for all purposes.
The Court held that an “independent contractor” does not have a single, universal meaning and
because different statutes have different scopes and it is not unusual for a worker to be classified
as an independent contractor for some purposes and as an employee for others. 11
NRS 706.473 cannot override the constitutional minimum wage guarantee
The Court held that NRS 706.473 cannot preclude coverage under the MWA. The court
reasoned that Nevada’s Constitution guarantees a minimum wage to workers who satisfy the
economic realities test and only the economic realities test determines whether a worker is an
employee for the purposes of the MWA. 12 Under the economic realities test, the court
“examines the totality of the circumstances and determines whether, as a matter of economic
reality, workers depend upon the business to which they render service for the opportunity to
work.”13 Under this test, an independent contractor is one who, “as a matter of economic fact, is
in business for himself.”14 The Court held that regardless of a worker’s status under NRS
706.473, is constitutionally entitled to a minimum hourly rage as long as a matter of economic
reality a worker is dependent on the business to which she or he renders service, is not in
business for herself or himself, and is not subject to the MWA’s express exceptions.
The NTA’s sweeiping definition of “independent contractor” does not apply to NRS Chapter 608
waiting time penalty claims
The Court found the district court erred in granting summary judgment on the grounds
that the NTA’s approval of the drivers’ leases rendered them independent contractors, and not
employees, for all purposes. The issue is whether a driver whose lease is approved by the NTA,
after satisfying all relevant requirements, is necessarily an independent contractor for purposes of
NRS Chapter 608 and NRS 608.255.
NRS 706.473 permits a taxicab company to lease cars to independent contractors. NTA’s
own regulations define “independent contractor” as “a person who leases a taxicab from a
certificate holder pursuant to 706.473.”15 The NTA’s definition of independent contractor does
not distinguish independent contractors from employees in a meaningful way and is
fundamentally different than the type of independent contractor relationship relevant to the
MWA or NRS Chapter 608. The Court held that the “statutorily created independent contractor
relationship” recognized in Yellow Cab is distinct from independent contractor status from MWA
or NRS Chapter 608 purposes.
NRS 608.0155 may affect a worker’s entitlement to waiting time penalties
The Court disagreed with the drivers’ assertion that they were entitled to seek waiting
time penalties under section (B) of the MWA, and their claim that if they were employees for
constitutional purposes, they could seek statutory waiting time penalties regardless of their status
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under NRS 708.0155.16 The Court held that when a plaintiff asserts both an MWA claim and
NRS Chapter 608 claim, the court will analyze the economic realities test, and NRS 608.0155
only applies to NRS Chapter 608 claims, it does not apply to MWA claims. 17
The court held the drivers stated two separate claims for relief: First, as relief for their
MWA claim and second, NRS 608.040 claim they sought a judgment against the defendant for
wages owed as prescribed by NRS 608.040. Under the MWA cause of action, the drivers were
seeking back pay, injunctive relief, punitive damages, and attorney fees. However, nothing in
the MWA provides availability of a separate statutory cause of action. The court did not read the
MWA as abrogating the requirement for the plaintiff to prove waiting time penalties under NRS
608.040. The worker must have resigned, quit or been discharged; the employer must have
failed to pay the wages when due, if the worker resigned or quit, or within three days of when
due, if the worker was discharged; and the worker must be an “employee” within the meaning of
NRS Chapter 608. The court did not read it as making such penalties available to a worker who
does not satisfy the statutory definition of “employee.”
Conclusion
This Court could not decide as a matter of law whether the drivers were employees under
either law. Both the economic realities test and the NRS 608.0155 test may be fact intensive and
the district court found certain material facts were disputed to which are potentially material to
the drivers’ status under the MWA and NRS Chapter 608. This Court reversed the district
court’s grant of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.
Concurrence
Justice Pickering wrote an opinion concurring with much of the majority’s analysis. She
agrees that the Court’s holding the contractual negation of an employment relationship does not
control whether a working relationship is that of an employer and employee with the meaning of
the MWA to the Nevada Constitution and that the resolution of the question turns on the factintensive application of the economic realities test. Further, Justice Pickering agrees with the
NTA’s approval of a driver’s lease does not demonstrate that driver is an independent contractor
for the purposes of Nevada’s minimum wage laws. In regard to the majority’s holding that
“NRS 608.0155 may affect a worker’s entitlement to waiting time penalties,” joins on the
understanding that this outcome results from the way the drivers pleaded their waiting time
penalty claims in the instant case, based in statute NRS 608.040, separate from their MWA
claims. Justice Pickering joined based on the understanding that the majority’s opinion did not
foreclose the availability of waiting time penalties under the MWA’s subsection (B).
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